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RESTRICTED USE ASSESSMENT IN
CALIFORNIA: CAN IT FULFILL
ITS OBJECTIVES?
Averill Q. Mix*
The California Land Conservation Act of 1965' (also known
as the Williamson Act and occasionally, though improperly, termed
"greenbelting") was an attempt to preserve agricultural land and
other open spaces. The means chosen was assessment based on a
method other than the normal standard of highest and best use.' The
original Act did not achieve this purpose,3 and a remedy was sought
by means of the "Open Space Amendment" to the California
Constitution in 1966.1
As a result of this Amendment, the original Act has been
revised extensively, and the Legislature has also passed additional
implementing legislation governing assessment practices.5 The assessor is now authorized to assess at other than the highest and best
use only if there is an "enforceable restriction" established on one of
the following four bases: a contract, an agreement, a scenic restriction, or an open-space easement.6 The four methods provided are
exclusive.
* A.B., 1947, M.B.A., 1949, Stanford University; J.D., 1970, University of Santa
Clara; Member, California Bar; Editor-in-Chief, SANTA CLARA LAWYER, 1969-70. The
author gratefully acknowledges the kind cooperation of Mr. Alfred E. Carlson and
Mr. Walter Mathison of the Santa Clara County Assessor's Office.
1 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-95 (West Supp. 1971). See generally, Comment,
Assessment of Farmland Under the CaliforniaLand ConservationAct and the "Breathing Space" Amendment, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1967).
2 CAL. CONSr. art. XI, § 12; 30 Op. CAL. ATir'Y GEN. 246 (1957); A. F. Gilmore
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 475, 9 Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1960).
3 See 47 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 171 (1966). The Attorney General stated that the
inclusion of "transitional values" in assessment of lands in developing areas was
Constitutionally required.
4 CAL. CONST. art. XXVIII. The amendment provided that open space lands subject to an "enforceable restriction" should be assessed in accordance with uses permitted under that restriction. See also A. Land, Unraveling the Rurban Fringe: A
Proposal for the Implementation of Proposition Three, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 421 (1968) ;
Report of Senate Factfinding Comm. on Natural Resources (Sec. II) 1967, at 43-49,
Supp. to Appendix to Senate Journal, Reg. Sess., 1967; D. Collin, Open-Space Land
Assessment Procedures (Cal. Farm Bureau Fed'n Pub. Affairs Div., Sept., 1967).
5 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 402.1, 421-29 (West 1970). See also Appraisal Policy
letter No. 8, "Open Space Legislation" (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, Intercounty
Equalization Div., Nov. 6, 1970).
6 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 422 (West 1970).
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Since passage of the Open Space Amendment and implementing

legislation, there has been a rapid increase in restricted acreage.
However, one writer estimated in 1969 that the "agreement"
procedure then accounted for approximately 98 percent of the
restricted land.7 Thus, other methods appeared to be insignificant.
Amendments to the Act in 1969 have now eliminated the "agreement"
method. 8 Nevertheless, the "agreement" method is historically
important in analyzing the present state of the law. An "agreement"
was essentially a simplification of today's "contract." Thus, an
understanding of the "contract" procedure is essential in order to
realize the significance of these simplifications. It should be kept in

mind, though, that the "contract" procedure (except for the rarely
used provisions regarding scenic restriction and open-space
easements) is today the only generally available means of obtaining
relief from assessment based on highest and best use.
CONTRACT METHOD

Under the "contract" procedure land must be "devoted to
agricultural use"' and located in an area designated by the city or
county concerned as an "agricultural preserve."' 1 The former
requirement of state approval of the contract was eliminated in
7 R. Alden & M. Shockro, Prejerential Assessment of Agricultural Lands:
Preservation or Discrimination? 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 59, 66 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Alden & Shockro]. The reader is urged to review this excellent article. Unfortunately, many of its conclusions are no longer correct because of the extensive 1969
amendments to both the Government Code and the Revenue and Taxation Code.
8 Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1372, §§ 28-29, at 2813, repealed CAL. GoV'T CODE §§
51255-56. The repeal has prospective application only, and agreements made prior to
November 10, 1969, are still valid. Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1372, § 44, at 2817. However,
CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18, § 51 (Feb. 28, 1970) applies many of the more restrictive
provisions required in current contracts to such agreements.
9 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51201(b), 51242 (West Supp. 1971). The former requirement that it be "classified as prime agricultural land" was deleted by Cal. Stats. 1969,
ch. 1372, § 11, at 2810. Other uses compatible with agriculture are also permitted.
CAL. Gov'T CODE 88 51201(e),

10 Id.

51238, 51243 (West Supp. 1971).

H8 51201(d), 51230, 51242. Although the prior requirement of a minimum
size of 100 acres is basically retained, the agricultural preserve may be of smaller size
if consistent with the general plan of the county or city and if smaller size is necessary
due to unique characteristics of agricultural enterprizes in the area. Id. § 51230. After
January 1, 1971, only counties and cities having general plans may establish agricultural preserves. Id. The local planning body must review any proposal to establish
an agricultural preserve to determine whether or not it is consistent with the general
plan. Id. § 51234.
If a contract is entered into with any landowner in an agricultural preserve, a
similar (but not necessarily identical) contract must be offered to every other landowner within the preserve. Id. § 51241.
The agricultural preserve may inciude "land devoted to recreational use or land
within a scenic highway corridor, a wildlife habitat area, a saltpond, a managed
wetland area, or a submerged area .
" Id.
I. § 51205. For definitions of these terms,
see id. § 51201.
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1969.11 This modification helped make today's "contract" procedure
resemble the now obsolete "agreement" procedure more closely.
The city or county may enforce the contract by specific performance, injunction, or any other remedy available at law. 1 2 Restrictions and privileges of the contract are binding on successors to
both parties.' Thus, cancellation (as opposed to nonrenewal) may
be undertaken only upon request of the landowner. 4
However, if the property is located within one mile of a city
and the city properly files a protest and notice of intention not to
be bound, the contract is null and void in the event of subsequent
annexation of the property by the city." Of course, the city is
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard when the land
involved is located within one mile of its limits.' 6
The contract must restrict the land to agriculture or other
compatible uses for a minimum period of ten years.'7 Thereafter, it
is automatically renewed upon each annual anniversary for an additional one-year term, unless advance notice of nonrenewal is given
by either party. 8 Thus, at any given time prior to such notice, the
minimum period during which the contract remains enforceable is
nine years.
Alternatively, the contract may be cancelled upon request of
the landholder, but only under extremely restrictive circumstances
and at a financial penalty that may be economically prohibitive.
Cancellation may be permitted by mutual agreement of the county
or city and the landowner, but only after a finding has been made
that cancellation is not inconsistent with purposes of the law and
not contrary to the public interest. The statute clearly states (subject to limited exceptions) that opportunity for alternative use and
uneconomic nature of the agricultural use are not acceptable rea9
sons.'
11 Formerly CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51250 (West 1966). Renumbered § 51248 and
amended by Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1372, § 20, at 2812 (West Supp. 1971). The recording requirement is retained, however.
12 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51251-52 (West Supp. 1971).
13 Id.§ 51243(b).
14 Id. § 51281.
15 Id. § 51243(b). This provision may provide an advantage to a landowner
located within one mile of a city limit. If the contract is thus automatically void,
without a specific request by the landowner, the city will probably waive any penalty
fee. See note 22, infra, and accompanying text.
16 Id. §§ 51233, 51243.5.

Id. § 51243(a), 51244.
18 Id. §§ 51244, 51245. Special renewal provisions apply where the initial term
17

is 20 years or longer. Id. § 51244.5. Nonrenewal as to a portion only is also authorized
under certain circumstances. Id. § 51245.
19 ld. § 51282.
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Even if cancellation is permitted, it is subject to a cancellation
fee (in lieu of deferred taxes) of 50 percent of the value of the
property as reassessed without the restriction." This cancellation
fee would approximate one-eighth of the land's fair market value.2
Although the Act does provide for modification or waiver of this
fee if the owner's act is involuntary or if he in fact continues agricultural use, such modification is strictly discretionary with the
county or city. 2 Obviously, then, the local political situation may
be of the utmost importance in determining whether or not a modification is granted or even if cancellation is permitted at all.
AGREEMENT METHOD

Prior to November 10, 1969, a summary "agreement" procedure was available under which it was not necessary that the land
be prime agricultural land; designation of an "agricultural preserve" was not required; there were no cancellation penalties; and
length, terms, conditions, and restrictions were determined by
negotiation between the county or city and the landowner. However,
these statutes have now been repealed.' The result is that the
"agreement" procedure (if it exists at all) is now indistinguishable
from the "contract" procedure. Thus, the heavy preponderance of
use of the "agreement" procedure vanished in 1970. In practice,
too, agreements made by many counties incorporated almost verbatim the statutory contract provisions.24 The 1969 amendments now
make it mandatory that any contract or agreement be at least as
restrictive as existing statutory provisions in order to obtain the
benefits of the Act. 5
As a result, even though one statute still acknowledges existence of the "agreement" procedure,2 6 the effect is merely to prevent
invalidation of assessments made under prior agreements.27 The
20 Id. § 51283.
21 Alden & Shockro, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 59, 64 (1969).
22 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51283 (West Supp. 1971). Special provisions apply to

waiver or deferral of such fees upon cancellation of an agreement (not a contract).
CAL. ADM. CODE lit. 18, § 51(d) (Feb. 28, 1970).
23 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51255-56 (West 1966), repealed, Cal. Stats. 1969, ch.
1372, §§ 28-29, at 2813. In addition, CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18, § 51 (Feb. 28, 1970)
applies many of the more restrictive provisions of the contract procedure to old
agreements, effective March 1, 1971. But see note 52, infra.
24 Alden & Shockro at 67-68. However, it is interesting to examine contract
forms used by various counties. Differences between some are substantial. See, e.g.,
note 52, infra.
25 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51240 (West Supp. 1971). CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18,

(Feb.

28, 1970)

applies the same restrictions to pre-1970 agreements,

§

51

effective

March 1, 1971.
26 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 422 (West 1970).

27 See statement of purpose of

the

1969 amendments to the Land Conservation
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fact that all references to "agreements" have now been deleted from
Chapter 7 of the Government Code indicates that this informal
method is no longer available.
On the other hand, the 1969 amendments did delete some of
the features which rendered the "contract" method objectionable,
primarily by eliminating the requirement of state approval and
control.2 s But, certain significant protections to the landowner were
also deleted, such as the provision that the land use limitation is a
determination that agriculture is the highest and best use29 and all
provisions relating to state compensation to local governments and
to landowners for public use. °
Thus, it must be assumed that in the absence of an informal
"agreement" procedure, the "contract" method will take over the
98 percent ratio formerly enjoyed by the "agreement" procedure.
Or, as seems more likely, the total utilization of the Act may decline
due to the greater restrictions. Use of the scenic restriction and
open-space easement methods will probably continue to be minimal
in view of statutory limitations on qualifying factors and additional
restrictions imposed on the landowner. 1
CONSEQUENCES

OF CANCELLATION OR NONRENEWAL

If reduced property taxes are to achieve their intended purpose
of preserving open spaces, there must be some deterrent to render.
indiscriminate cancellation or nonrenewal unattractive. Here, a
limited recapture of back taxes will be only a slight deterrent to the
farmer who has the opportunity to reap a large capital gain; while
the possibility of unlimited recapture may be so punitive that few
landowners will be willing to seek the benefits of the statutes.3 2
California has attempted to achieve a middle ground between
these two extremes. Under the now repealed "agreement" procedure,
a cancellation penalty was not mandatory and was rarely imposed."
Act of 1965, contained in Cal. Stats. 1969, ch. 1372, § 44, at 2817. See also CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE § 421(c) (West 1970).
28 See note 11, supra.
29 Formerly CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51222 (West 1966), repealed, Cal. Stats. 1969,
ch. 1372, § 6, at 2807.
30 Formerly CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51260-63 (West 1966), repealed, Cal. Stats.
1969, ch. 1372, § 30, at 2813.
31 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51201(i)-(n), 51205, 51220(d) (West Supp. 1971);
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 421(d)-(e) (West 1970).
32 See Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation, 1964 Wisc. L.
REV. 628, 639; Alden & Shockro at 62-63.
33 However, cancellation penalties must be applied to such agreements after
March 1, 1971, if the landowner is to retain the benefits of the restricted use assessment. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18, § 51 (Feb, 2$1 1970). But see note 52, infra.
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This fact was undoubtedly an important motivation behind the 98
percent estimated utilization of the "agreement" method. Since repeal of the "agreement" procedure and other changes made in
1969, penalties in California now seem to be more heavily weighted
on the punitive side. Thus, substantially decreased utilization of the
Williamson Act in future years seems to be a distinct possibility.
Cancellation
Cancellation at the landowner's request 3 4 offers the advantage
of relatively prompt availability of the land free of the enforceable
restriction. However, the burden of proof required for the landowner to justify cancellation is correspondingly heavy. Furthermore,
even if the landowner sustains his burden of proof, cancellation is
not available to him as a matter of right but is discretionary with
the city or county.s5
Under the current California practice of assessment at 25 percent of total cash value," the 50 percent fee imposed upon cancellation will approximate one-eighth of the fair market value of the
land at the time cancellation is granted. Although this fee may seem
prohibitive at first glance, its consequences are largely dependent
upon the economics of the particular factual situation. A set of
hypothetical figures is helpful to analyze the possibilities.
Assume a 100-acre parcel in a developing urban fringe area. Its
fair market value when used strictly for agricultural purposes is
$660 per acre, or a total of $66,000. If available for residential
purposes, the same parcel might reasonably be valued at $10,000
per acre. Based on the 25 percent equalization ratio, assessed valuations would therefore be $16,500 and $250,000, respectively. Assuming a composite tax rate of $10 per $100 of assessed valuation
(a common rate in areas of California that are in the process of
change from rural to urban), Table 1 shows the property tax consequences of cancellation at the end of any given year through the
first 15 years of a restrictive contract carrying the required automatic renewal clause.
The figures in Table 1 show a large net loss to the landowner in
34 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51281 (West Supp. 1971). This option cannot be exercised
by the city or county. Under prior law, cancellation could be initiated by any governmental body. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51281 (West 1966), amended, Cal. Stats. 1969, ch.
1372, § 31, at 2813. Fear has been expressed that such cancellation could have been
politically motivated. See Alden & Shockro at 68.
35 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1971).
s6 Although a few counties assessed at lower ratios until recently, CAL. REV. &
TAx. CODE § 401 (West 1970) makes the 25 percent ratio compulsory statewide beginning with the lien date for the 1971-72 fiscal year, ixe., March 1, 1971.
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the early years, but a significant gain in the later years. However,
this table assumes a stable assessed valuation for both purposes
during the entire 15-year period. This, of course, is unlikely to
occur in practice, and the example in Table 1 must therefore be
considered an oversimplification.
The illustration may be made more practical by assuming that
the same 100-acre parcel has the same fair market value of $660
per acre as agricultural land at the time the contract is signed.
Again, the assessed valuation would be $16,500. But assume now
that the value of agricultural land inflates at a rate of five percent
per year in each succeeding year.
Assume further that the land will not be developed for five
years from the date of the contract and will not be valued for residential purposes at $10,000 per acre until the lien date of that
taxable year. The assessed valuation in the fifth year will therefore
be $250,000, but this value must be discounted for prior years.
Therefore, assume that the value for residential purposes is discounted based on a ten percent compounded annual return on investment through the fifth year. Finally, assume that the value of the
property if still not developed during the fifth year inflates thereafter
at only five percent a year. Table 2 shows the result of this more
sophisticated analysis.
In the illustrations in both tables there is a definite crossover
point where the cancellation penalty becomes less than the net
reduction in the landowner's property taxes. Thus, in later years,
the penalty can hardly be said to be prohibitive. It is essential, however, that the economics of each situation be analyzed in detail in
some such manner as this.
Such an analysis, though essential, is severely limited in usefulness by the many intangibles involved. Estimating rates of inflation
in value will be extremely difficult; they will rarely follow such a
uniform annual course, and, even if they do, the likelihood of their
being reflected immediately in the assessed valuation is limited. A
change in the assumed rate of return on invested capital will make
a significant difference; also missing from the calculation is any
allowance based upon the possibility of alternative employment of
the capital involved. Finally, the element of risk, including the possibility of denial by the city or county of permission to cancel, will
be almost impossible to estimate in terms of dollars; and in the
event that sale of a large parcel is imminent, federal income and
estate tax consequences to the landowner can be extremely significant.
In short, too many intangibles are involved to permit analysis
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purely on the basis of mathematical formula. The final decision
must depend on the good business judgment of the landowner and
his advisors. Nevertheless, the financial penalty for cancellation may
be more apparent than real in many economic situations. Of course,
once cancellation is accomplished and the enforceable restrictions
are removed, the assessor has no alternative but to immediately
assess the land in accordance with the standard of highest and best
use. 7 Presumably, therefore, the farmer will not attempt to cancel
unless a profitable sale for development is likely in the immediate
future. 88
Nonrenewal
Contrasted with the limited applicability of cancellation, nonrenewal is available to either party as a matter of right. It is, however, subject to the requirement of proper notice,89 or else the
contract will renew automatically. The major problem, however, is
that nonrenewal and removal of enforceable restrictions cannot be
effective for at least nine years from the next succeeding anniversary
date of the contract, except in the unlikely event that cancellation
is granted during the nine-year period after notice of nonrenewal.
This period could, of course, be made even longer by provisions of
the contract. The difficulties of planning for the economic situation
that might exist nine years in the future are obvious.
Assume, though, that the trend toward urbanization in the
particular area is sufficiently well established so that the landowner
can reasonably foresee the possibility of a profitable sale after expiration of the restrictions; what, then, will be the financial consequences
to him of holding the land for the nine-year period required? In the
case of agricultural land, the most significant expense of holding
will usually be the property tax, determined by the value placed on
the land by the assessor. Here, the statutes regarding the course
to be followed by the assessor appear confusing, and, probably due
to the very limited use so far of the contract procedure, no appellate
cases on the point have yet been decided.
The position of the assessor must necessarily be limited by
87 30 Op. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 246 (1957); CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 12; CAL. REV.
& TAx. CODE §§ 401, 422 (West 1970).
8 However, use of such reasoning to justify cancellation is expressly prohibited
by CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1971). This prohibition may lead to
attempts to use trumped-up justifications.
89 The landowner must give notice of nonrenewal at least 90 days prior to an
anniversary date of the contract, while the city or county is required to give 60 days
notice. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51245 (West Supp. 1971). The lengthy period that must
elapse prior to final termination of the restriction seems to minimize the possibility
of political manipulation.
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two extremes. The position most liberal to the farmer is that the
assessor will continue to assess at the value for agricultural use
during the entire period (nine years or more) prior to final expiration of the enforceable restrictions. The basic method of assessment
would therefore be the capitalization of income method without
consideration of comparative sales data.4" Such a simplistic approach is useful, however, only in determining the lower limits of
assessment.4 1
On the other hand, a maximum assessment would be realized
if the assessor takes the position that notice of nonrenewal renders
expiration of the restrictions certain at a particular time in the
future. He might thus reason that restrictions are no longer enforceable. If so, section 422 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
would no longer apply, and assessment based on highest and best
use (discounted for present value) is the required method.
The actual approach to be used is spelled out in section 426 (b)
of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 42 This approach is extremely
complex and requires a combination of the methods already outlined
as the two extremes. However, since nonrenewal of many contracts
at some time in the future is a practical certainty, the consequences
must be considered by every landowner seeking to enter into any
of the restrictive arrangements provided by the Williamson Act.
Under section 426(b) the assessed value must be recomputed
by a six-step procedure each year until final termination of the
restrictions. To illustrate the procedure, let us assume the same
factual situation as used previously in the computation of the financial consequences of cancellation, i.e., a 100-acre parcel valued today at $660 per acre for agricultural use and estimated to be valued
40 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 423 (West 1970). The method provided is quite
complex. Essentially, it is based on either actual income or a reasonable yield under
prudent management and subject to the enforceable restrictions. Since the assessor is

not permitted even to look at comparative sales data for the purpose of determining
the capitalization rate (CAL. ADm. CODE tit. 18, § 8(i) (Feb. 28, 1970)), this method
will usually result in the lowest possible assessment. See also Alden & Shockro, 42 S.
CAL. L. REv. 59, 66 n.37 (1969).
41 CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE § 426 (West 1970) was added in 1969 and expressly
provides:
Notwithstanding any provisions of section 423 to the contrary:

(a) If land is subject to an enforceable restriction . . . the county assessor shall value such land as provided in subdivision (b) under any of the
following conditions:
(1) Where the owner of land subject to contract or agreement has served
notice of nonrenewal

. . .

(2) Where the county or city has served notice of nonrenewal . . . .
"(S)" Vhere less than six years remain to the expiration of the enforceable
restriction.
42 (West 1970).
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five years from now at $10,000 per acre for residential development.
The statute provides for computation as follows:
"(1) Determine the full cash value of the land as if it were
not subject to enforceable restrictions." This means the value for
the highest and best use.4 Since our assumption is that this use is
residential development, the fair market value in five years will be
$1,000,000. This figure, since it is the estimated value five years
hence, must be discounted by the same procedure used in Table 2.
Thus, the full cash value today is $683,016.
"(2) Determine the value of the land by capitalization of income as provided in Section 423 and without regard to the existence
of any of the conditions in subdivision (a)." The fact that notice
of nonrenewal has been given is to be ignored and the capitalization
method used. To avoid the complex calculation of the capitalization
method,44 which is not directly in point here and which would
require the assumption of many additional facts, assume that the
figure of $660 per acre (or a total of $66,000) is the result of this
computation.
"(3) Subtract the value determined in subdivision (b) (2) by
capitalization of income from the full cash value determined in
subdivision (b)(1)." $683,016 minus $66,000 is $617,016.
"(4) Using the rate announced by the board pursuant to subdivision (b) (1) of Section 423, discount the amount obtained in
subdivision (b) (3) of this section for the number of years remaining
until the termination of the enforceable restriction." The rate an46
nounced on September 1, 1970, was 6.75 percent. Therefore,
$617,016 must be discounted by this rate for the remaining contract
46
period. Using standard present worth tables at 6.75 percent for
ten years, the result is $321,095.1

7

"(5) Determine the value of the land by adding the value
determined by capitalization of income as provided in subdivision
(b)(2) and the value obtained in subdivision (b)(4)." Adding
$66,000 and $321,095, we get $387,095. This is considered, for
43 30 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 246 (1957).

44 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 423 (West 1970).
45 Letter to County Assessors of August 31, 1970, from Mr. Ronald B. Welch,

Assistant Executive Secretary, Property Taxes, California State Board of Equalization.
46 CoMPOUND INTEREST & ANNUITY TABLES (Financial Publishing Co., 4th ed.
1966) at 703.
47 The figure of $321,095 and other figures for the first year are used for illustrative purposes only, since they do not enter into the final tax computation. See
footnote included in Table 3.
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purposes of Article 1.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, to be the
value of the land today.
"(6) Apply the ratio prescribed in Section 401 to the value
of the land determined in subdivision (b) (5) to obtain its assessed
value." Therefore, the assessed valuation is 25 percent of $387,095,
or $96,774.
Table 3 shows the result of this calculation, assuming that the
landowner properly served notice of nonrenewal prior to the first
anniversary date of his contract. Again, a composite tax rate of $10
per $100 of assessed valuation is used, and the same assumption is
made that the value of the land for strictly agricultural purposes
inflates at a constant rate of five percent per year, while for development purposes it inflates at ten percent annually for the first five
years and thereafter at five percent.
Under the assumed facts, Table 3 shows a net saving in taxes
$69,115 (or 26 percent) over the ten-year period, compared
only
of
with taxes the farmer would have paid if he had not sought the
benefits of the Act. Even this saving is based on a historically high
rate of capitalization. Use of a lower rate would increase the figures
obtained under section 42 6(b) (4) and would, in turn, increase the
taxes payable during the period following notice of nonrenewal.
The available saving seems to be small compensation for the
landowner's surrender of his freedom of action for a ten-year period.
Further, the farmer may have sought the benefits of the Act due
to his inability to pay a tax based on residential assessment out of
his income from cultivation of the land. If he later finds that cultivation is uneconomical and that nonrenewal would be a better
alternative, he is faced with the prospect of paying taxes for nine
years at a rate nearly as high as he would have paid had he not
entered into the restrictive contract. Still, he may not use the land
for any purpose other than agriculture; he may thus be totally
unable to pay the taxes assessed and be forced to sell prematurely
to a land speculator-a consequence that the Act was intended to
avoid.4 8 Even so, he may be unable to find a speculator willing to
buy land that is restricted from any development for up to nine
years. The speculator, too, would be required to pay the expense
48 Some farmers, feeling that they will be forced to sell in the near future, have
apparently given serious consideration to permitting their taxes to become delinquent
for the maximum redemption period of five years allowed by CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §
3511 (West 1970). They evidently feel that such delinquency may be economically
preferable to accepting restrictions that they consider unreasonable. It is, of course,
impossible as yet to determine if they will follow through on such a course of action.
Interview with Mr. Raymond C. Benech, President, Santa Clara County Farm Bureau,
in San Jose, California, January 19, 1971.
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of carrying the land out of his own pocket, since, presumably, the
agricultural use to which he was limited would not support the
taxes assessed. Even if a speculator would purchase land under
such circumstances, he would certainly be unwilling to pay anything
approaching the true worth of the land.
Thus, the economics of nonrenewal appear to be highly punitive
to the farmer. Cancellation, with its single penalty payment presumably made from the proceeds of sale, seems a far better alternative.49
However, it must be remembered that cancellation is not available
to the landowner as a matter of right. Further, the uneconomic
nature of the agricultural operation is specifically declared not to
be a sufficient reason for cancellation. ° Thus the farmer may be left
only with the prospects of continuing to lose money in agriculture,
entering into a forced sale, or, at worst, sale of his property for
unpaid taxes. Faced with such unpalatable alternatives, he may be
sorely tempted to find a way of exerting political pressure to cause
the governmental body concerned to grant his request for cancellation. Finally, it must be remembered that the landowner may not be
able to base his decision on comparative costs alone. His decision
may, in fact, be dictated by the pragmatic consideration of whether
or not he has sufficient cash available at the time required.
Problems in interpretationof the statutes
Although the complex assessment formula set forth in section
426(b) of the Revenue and Taxation Code seems complete, certain
apparent inconsistencies in the statutes cast some doubt on the
general applicability of the formula.
Subsection 426(a) (5) of the Revenue and Taxation Code51
provides that the assessment formula applied here in Table 3 is to
be used "[w] here less than six years remain to the expiration of the
enforceable restriction." But since the contract must have an auto52
matic renewal provision to be eligible for favorable tax treatment,
49 But see Alden & Shockro at 64. However, the contrary opinion therein was
expressed prior to the passage of CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 426 (West 1970), which
contains the mandatory assessment formula.
50 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51282 (West Supp. 1971). Weighing against the statutory
command is the fact that the taxing jurisdiction will immediately receive substantially
increased revenues: first, from the cancellation penalty (unless waived) ; second, from
a substantially increased assessment based on highest and best use of the land; and,
ultimately, an even greater increase at the time the property is improved. In the Land
Conservation Act of 1965 as originally enacted, state subsidies were provided to minimize the incentive of local governments to cancel, but these subsidies have now been
repealed. Formerly CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51260-63 (West 1966), repealed, Cal. Stats.
1969, ch. 1372, § 30, at 2813. See.Alden & Shockro at 67.
51 (West 1970).
52 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51240, 51244-45 (West Supp. 1971). CAL. ADM. CODE
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notice of nonrenewal cannot be effective for at least nine years.
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the time periods specified. A close reading of the statute, though, shows that the formula
is to be applied "under any" of several enumerated situations.3
Consequently, the various time periods can be mutually exclusive,
and the inconsistency vanishes.
tit. 18, § 51(a) (1) (Feb. 28, 1970) applies the same requirement to pre-1970 agreements, effective March 1, 1971. The latter section references Article 1.5, Chapter 3,
Part 2, Division 3, of the Revenue and Taxation Code. This is in error because no
such Division exists. Apparently, the reference should be to Division 1, i.e., CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE §§ 421-29 (West 1970).
But even assuming that the proper reference is to Division 1, the retroactive
application of the Administrative Code seems to be based on somewhat nebulous
authority, although section 421(c) of the Revenue and Taxation Code might be interpreted in some such manner. The Administrative Code is not statutory law. Essentially, it consists of administrative regulations that must be based on statutory authority and that must not be inconsistent with any relevant statutes. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 11373-74 (West 1966).
Furthermore, section 421(c) of the Revenue and Taxation Code may be an
unconstitutional impairment of a contract obligation under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
and CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16, if it is interpreted to require that pre-1970 agreements
must be brought up to current standards. Although this exact point has never been
decided, a traditional Constitutional approach would certainly hold it invalid as so
interpreted. See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 285 (1956) and cases cited therein. Note,
however, that most authority on the point is quite well-aged. The clearest United
States Supreme Court decision on a related subject dates back to 1938 and states: "[A]
legislative enactment may contain provisions which, when accepted as the basis of
action by individuals, become contracts between them and the State or its subdivisions
within the protection of Article 1, § 10. [Footnote omitted.] If the people's representatives deem it in the public interest they may adopt a policy of contracting in respect
of public business for a term longer than the life of the current session of the legislature . . . ." Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). See also
Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 576 (1967).
The contract in use by Santa Clara County during 1970 apparently avoids the
Constitutional question by inclusion of the following sentence in paragraph 1: "This
contract is subject to all provisions of this Act [the California Land Conservation
Act of 1965] including any amendments thereto which may hereafter be enacted."
A partial survey covering most California counties having rapidly expanding urban
areas showed that in December, 1970, contracts in use in the following counties
included substantially similar provisions: Monterey, Napa, Orange, San Bernadino,
Solano, and Sonoma. However, in the following counties there were no such provisions and the Constitutional issue is present: Alameda, Los Angeles, Matin, San
Mateo, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz. A third group of counties attempts to meet
the Constitutional problem in other ways: Contra Costa, Fresno, Riverside, San
Diego, and Ventura.
Finally, the intent of the 1969 amendments to the Williamson Act seems contrary
to an interpretation applying section 421(c) to pre-1970 agreements. For example,
one of the amended sections states: "Any contract or agreement entered into pursuant to this chapter prior to the 61st day following final adjournment of the 1969
Regular Session of the Legislature may be amended to conform with the provisions
of this act as amended at such session upon the mutual agreement of all parties. .. ."
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51253 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added). Of course, the
language of sections 421(c) and 422 may also mean that the landowner has a choice
of whether or not to consent to amend his agreement. But, if he does not, his land
will not qualify for assessment based on an enforceable restriction.
53 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 426(a) (West 1970) (emphasis added). See note
41, supra.

1971]

WILLIAMSON ACT

Section 402.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code established
"a rebuttable presumption that restrictions will not be removed or
54
substantially modified in the predictable future." Thus the assessor must assess only in accordance with permitted uses. However,
this presumption provides no solace for the landowner who has
given notice of his intent not to renew, since a specifically listed
ground for rebuttal is that "a necessary party to the restriction has
indicated an intent to permit its expiration . . . . , Nevertheless,
the assessor is permitted to consider "representative sales of comparable land not under restriction but upon which natural limitations have substantially the same effect as restrictions."56 This
proviso may give the landowner an opening for introduction of
carefully selected evidence of the uneconomic nature of the agricultural use. Such evidence may be difficult to obtain, though, since
the required absence of enforceable restrictions will probably raise
the selling price of other comparable land.
A final problem is whether taxes on land currently assessed at
its highest and best use will be rolled back or merely frozen at the
rate effective when the contract is entered into. Although the intent
of the Williamson Act would seem to require such a rollback in
order to encourage farmers to enter into restrictive agreements, one
commentator feels that the current statutes are unclear."7 One regulation, effective on March 1, 1971, seems to deny restricted use
assessment where an agreement made prior to November 10, 1969,
provided for a guaranteed rollback. 8 Since there is no comparable
provision governing restrictions arrived at through the contract
procedure, the implication is that a contract providing for a rollback
is effective. Ultimately, the question of whether or not there will be
a rollback depends on the result of application of the formula provided in section 423 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.
ALTERNATE METHODS

Although the contract restriction is by far the most significant
way for the urban fringe farmer to obtain property tax relief, other
methods are also available. First, zoning restrictions alone (i.e., not
incorporated into a contract) are enforceable restrictions. Zoning
alone may be effective in particular cases, but such an approach is
54
55
56
57

Id. § 402.1
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Alden & Shockro at 67.

58 CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18, § 51(b)

(Feb. 28, 1970) provides in part: "An agree-

ment in order to qualify for restricted use assessment must not contain any of the
following: (1) A provision purporting to bind the assessor to a particular assessment
formula."
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closely related to the approach of the Land Conservation Act of
1965 as it was originally enacted. That approach failed because the
assessor was required by other statutes to consider comparative
sales that might reflect the "transitional value" of an expiring restriction."0
The problem with zoning is much the same. Experience has
shown that zoning restrictions in the urban fringe areas are subject
to frequent change.6" Thus, the assessor must consider the "transitional value" based on the possibility that zoning, though presently
enforceable, may be changed in the future. Although section 402.1
of the Revenue and Taxation Code establishes a rebuttable presumption that such restrictions will not be removed or substantially
modified in the predictable future, rebuttal on the basis of "past
history of like use restrictions"'" is specifically allowed. In urban
fringe areas a past history of change is common.
Thus, restriction by zoning will usually be ineffective except in
areas where the change from rural to urban is relatively slow. But
in such areas farmers will not be under the heavy pressure of drastically increased assessments, since land values will not be rising precipitously. Such farmers will usually have little need for the tax
benefits of enforceable restrictions.
Scenic restrictions6" and open-space easementsO are other
possible methods of achieving tax savings. Contrasted with noncontract zoning restrictions, these are "enforceable restrictions"
within the meaning of section 422 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code. 64
Statutes regarding scenic restrictions date back to 1959, and
restricted use assessment seems to have been applied merely as an
afterthought. By definition, though, scenic restrictions are of extremely limited applicability. Cancellation and nonrenewal problems
are similar (though not identical) to those already discussed. Furthermore, it seems probable that any attempted cancellation could turn
into an emotional (and hence political) issue that could easily
outweigh legal and financial considerations. Thus, the utilization of
scenic restrictions will probably continue to be minimal.
59 See 47 OP. CAL. ATT'y
60

GEN. 171 (1966).

Alden & Shockro at 61.

61 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1 (West 1970).
62 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-54 (West 1966); CAL. REV.

& TAX. CODE

§ 421(d)

(West 1970).
63 CAL. GOV'T CODE

§ 421(e) (West 1970).
64 (West 1970).

§ 51050-65 (West Supp. 1971); CA.. REv. &

TAX. CODE
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The open-space easement is a more recent innovation (1969).
Thus, it was also more closely tied in with the Williamson Act.
Although the original statutes regarding scenic restrictions remain
on the books, they seem to be nearly swallowed up by the newer
provisions. 65
Open-space easements are subject to acceptance by the city or
county 6 in accordance with specific statutory standards.6 7 These
standards reflect the general public interest in preservation of open
space and include, among others, such factors as scenic value, preservation of trees, flood control, value as a wildlife preserve, and
the possibility that the land will eventually be acquired for public
use. Obviously, establishment of any of these requisites would
inhibit any later attempt by the owner to justify cancellation of the
restrictions.
Furthermore, the minimum term for open-space easements is
20 years,6 8 and the city or county may limit extraction of natural
resources.69 Thus, the landowner may find his hands tied even more
tightly than under a contract in an agricultural preserve. The emotional factor discussed in relation to scenic restrictions may also
come into play.
Finally, the mind of the lawyer may boggle at the terms "easement" and "covenant running with the land," as they appear continually throughout the controlling statutes. 0 Since recording of
both acceptance of the easement 7l and its abandonment 72 are required, could a failure to agree on abandonment after expiration of
the 20-year term amount to a permanent cloud on the title?
CONCLUSION

The original Land Conservation Act of 1965 undoubtedly had
defects. The "agreement" procedure, whereby all cancellation penalties could be avoided, was clearly too liberal toward the farmer. The
1969 amendments have certainly provided strong deterrents that
will aid in accomplishing the ultimate objective of retaining land
as open space. But there is also a real danger that the amendments
have become so punitive that few landowners will be willing to
65 See CAL.

66
67
68
69
70

GOV'T CODE

Id. § 51055.

Id. § 51056.
Id. § 51053.
Id. § 51054.
See, e.g., id. § 51051.
71 Id. § 51059.
72 Id. § 51062.

§ 51056 (West Supp. 1971).
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accept the restrictions of the Act.73 Thus, the objectives may be
totally defeated. Excessively punitive provisions are present in all
of the presently available methods, namely, contract restrictions,
scenic restrictions, and open-space easements.
The experience of late 1970 and early 1971 does not, however,
bear out this prediction. In Santa Clara County, for example, 209
applications to include 47,431 acres in the agricultural preserve
were approved by the Board of Supervisors on February 24, 1971.
This compares with 143 applications, covering 23,694 acres, approved in 1969-70.7' And in Alameda County, applications covering
approximately 40,000 acres were filed in 1970, compared with a
total of slightly less than 100,000 acres set aside during the entire
period from 1966 through 1969. 71 In explaining their reasons for
accepting use restrictions, ranchers are quoted as saying, "We don't
like a lot of things about the Williamson Act, but right now we
have no choice . . . we're boxed in. It's this or go broke. ' 76 Also,
"They tax land at $13 per acre, and the most you can get in grazing
fees is $7. They have some of our property valued at $1,000 per
acre .... [I] f you come across any buyers with that kind of money,
'77
I'd sure appreciate hearing about it."

These reactions of ranchers reveal an acquiescence to the Act
only as a last resort. Probably their motivation has been greatly
intensified by the forced compliance of all counties with the statewide 25 percent assessment ratio. 8 Clearly, many assessors are only
73 In apparent recognition of this possibility, A.B. 2175 was introduced, but
failed to pass, in the 1970 Regular Session of the California Legislature. This bill
would have provided for fifty-year development planning contracts, subject to annual
review for the immediately ensuing five-year period. Such contracts would have been
designated "enforceable restrictions" within the meaning of Article XXVIII of the
California Constitution. The stated purpose of the bill was "to provide for timely
and orderly development of land consistent with the needs of an expanding urban
area while obviating scattered or premature development . . . ." A.B. 2175 § 66452.5.
74 During the February 24, 1971, meeting, the Board also postponed action on
an additional 64 applications covering 1,598 acres. In these cases some governmental
body had filed a notice of objection. The Board rejected 28 applications covering 147
acres. All parcels in the latter group were smaller than ten acres each.
Santa Clara County inclusions actually approved in prior years are as follows:

Year

Number of
Applications

Acres

1966-67
1967-68
1968-69

35
56
88

83,781
64,767
22,723

75 "Taxes Threaten Ranches-Rural Landowners Rush to Ag Preserve As 'Last
Hope For Survival,'" The Times (Pleasanton, Cal.), Jan. 20, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
76 Id.
77 Id. col. 3.
78 See note 36, supra.

1971]

WILLIAMSON ACT

now catching up with values that have been increasing over many
years. Thus, 1970 may ultimately prove to have been a highly
abnormal year, and it still seems reasonable to predict that farmers
will reduce their voluntary utilization of the Williamson Act in
future years. Furthermore, the increase in applications in 1970-71
may cause some counties, and the Legislature, to become concerned
about the quantity of acreage that is becoming committed to reduced
assessment for long periods of time. This may cause the Legislature
to subject applicants for admission to the benefits of the Act to even
more restrictive requirements.
Clearly, a delicate balance must be struck that is neither too
liberal in permitting cancellation or nonrenewal by the landowners
nor too punitive in its economic consequences. California does not
yet seem to have found this balance. Until it does, we cannot expect
that assessment based on restricted use will fully achieve its stated
objective of "preservation of a maximum amount of the limited
supply of agricultural land ....

9

79 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51220(a) (West Supp. 1971).

